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ABSTRACT
Timing side-channels represent an insidious security challenge for
cloud computing, because: (a) massive parallelism in the cloud
makes timing channels pervasive and hard to control; (b) timing
channels enable one customer to steal information from another
without leaving a trail or raising alarms; (c) only the cloud provider
can feasibly detect and report such attacks, but the provider’s in-
centives are not to; and (d) resource partitioning schemes for tim-
ing channel control undermine statistical sharing efficiency, and,
with it, the cloud computing business model. We propose a new
approach to timing channel control, using provider-enforced de-
terministic execution instead of resource partitioning to eliminate
timing channels within a shared cloud domain. Provider-enforced
determinism prevents execution timing from affecting the results
of a compute task, however large or parallel, ensuring that a task’s
outputs leak no timing information apart from explicit timing inputs
and total compute duration. Experiments with a prototype OS for
deterministic cloud computing suggest that such an approach may
be practical and efficient. The OS supports deterministic versions
of familiar APIs such as processes, threads, shared memory, and
file systems, and runs coarse-grained parallel tasks as efficiently
and scalably as current timing channel-ridden systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is hotly debated whether individuals and companies should
trust cloud providers with sensitive information, but few would
suggest that a cloud customer should trust the provider and all the
provider’s other customers. Yet this may soon be the cloud’s de
facto security model—if it isn’t already—due to timing channels.
Timing channels are well-known and well-studied [20,37], origi-
nally driven by military-grade security demands. They have gained
broader relevance, however, in the context of commercially appli-
cable information flow control [17, 38], and due to the discovery
that computations unintentionally broadcast sensitive information
via numerous timing channels in shared environments. A sensitive
computation sharing a CPU core with an attacker, through either
time division or hyperthreading, is akin to standing behind a trans-
parent shower door: e.g., an attacker may steal information from
the victim via the shared L1 data cache [28], shared functional
units [35], the branch target cache [2], or the instruction cache [1].
Most of the above attacks were demonstrated between processes
on a conventional OS, but per-customer VMs on a provider-owned
machine share resources in essentially the same way, making the
results theoretically applicable to clouds—especially those rely-
ing on “container-based” virtualization [32]. Timing attacks have
even been demonstrated specifically on VMs commonly used in
clouds [30], although it is not yet clear how easily these lab-based
experiments could be replicated in a noisy commercial cloud.
Whether timing channels represent an immediate security threat
or merely a hairline fracture, it is worth repeating the security adage,
“attacks never get worse; they only get better.” Today’s timing-
channel exploits pick low-hanging fruit, extracting information from
only one high-bandwidth timing channel at a time via straightfor-
ward analysis techniques. Shared computing environments have
many other timing channels, such as L3 caches shared between
cores, memory and I/O busses, and cluster interconnects. There are
probably ways to extract weaker signals from stronger noise, ag-
gregate information from low-rate leaks over time, correlate leaks
across multiple channels, etc. Attack amplification techniques ap-
plicable to arbitrary timing channels have already appeared [29].
It would simply be foolish for us to expect timing attacks not to
continue getting more effective and more practical over time.
In the rest of this paper, we set aside the “imminence of threat”
debate and simply assume that at some point, sooner or later, tim-
ing channels will become an important cloud security issue. We
focus here on understanding the basic nature of the timing chan-
nel problem in the cloud context, independent of specific channels
and attacks, and on discovering potential solutions compatible with
the requirements of cloud environments. We focus in particular
on timing channels internal to a cloud: other side-channels, such
as those derived from a client’s communication with a cloud-based
service [12], are also important but beyond our present scope.
We make three main contributions. First, we identify four ways
the cloud computing model amplifies timing channel security risks
compared with traditional infrastructure. Second, we propose a
new method of timing channel control based on provider-enforced
deterministic execution, which aggregates all internal timing chan-
nels into a single controllable channel at the cloud’s border. Third,
we present a proof-of-concept cloud computing OS that enforces
determinism, with preliminary results suggesting that it could sup-
port parallel cloud applications efficiently without sacrificing the
cloud provider’s flexibility in allocating resources to clients.
2. TIMING CHANNELS IN THE CLOUD
Current cloud privacy discussions focus on the provider’s obli-
gation to enforce security and earn the customer’s trust. These dis-
cussions presuppose the provider’s full awareness of the security
risks from which it must shield the customer [24,27]. But exposure
to malice from another customer’s software may be hard for the
provider to detect or prevent without careful consideration of the
cloud’s architecture. Timing channels typify such insidious risks.
Although timing channels represent an important security risk in
any shared infrastructure, the cloud model exacerbates these risks
in at least four specific ways, which we discuss below. The first
two points are well-known to some but worth repeating, while to
our knowledge the second two have not previously been discussed.
Parallelism creates pervasive timing channels.
In the days of uniprocessors and single-threaded processes, it
was possible to control timing channels by limiting untrusted pro-
cesses’ access to high-resolution clocks and timers, and to other I/O
devices that can behave like clocks [20, 37]. But today’s increas-
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volatile long long timer = 0;
void *timer_func(void *)
{ while (1) timer++; }
main() {
pthread_create(&timer_thread, NULL,
timer_func, NULL);
...
// Read the "current time"
long long timestamp = timer;
...
}
Figure 1: Implementing a high-resolution reference clock using
threads, when no explicit hardware clocks are available.
ingly parallelism-oriented hardware—especially in the massively
parallel cloud context—creates numerous implicit, high-resolution
clocks that have nothing to do with I/O. Hardware caches and inter-
connects in their many forms all represent shared resources that can
be modulated [1, 2, 28, 35]. A thread running in a loop can create
a high-resolution reference clock [37], as illustrated by the trivial
code in Figure 1, even if the OS or VM has virtualized or disabled
all “explicit” hardware clocks. Even processes with no access to
explicit clocks, timers, or other devices, can thus use parallelism-
derived implicit clocks to exploit timing channels.
Insider attacks become outsider attacks.
With notable exceptions [10], timing channel exploits usually re-
quire the attacker to run a sophisticated, CPU-intensive program
on the victim’s machine. On private infrastructure, this usually
means the attacker must be an “insider” or have already compro-
mised the machine. But a cloud provider’s business is to run any
paying customer’s computation with “no questions asked.” Since
the provider may colocate arbitrary customers’ computations on a
given machine without the knowledge or consent of either, a timing
attack exploitable only by “insiders” on private infrastructure may
be mounted by malicious “outsiders” in the cloud. An attacker
may simply “fish” for secrets without even knowing the identity
of the co-resident victim, by monitoring timing channels for SSH
keystrokes for example, or the attacker may deliberately attempt to
obtain co-residency with a specific target [30].
Cloud-based timing attacks are unlikely to be caught.
The owner of private infrastructure has the right to monitor and
inspect any running software to detect malicious code. Cloud cus-
tomers cannot monitor other customers’ computations to protect
themselves against timing attacks, however (except by engaging
in “counter-espionage” attacks themselves), and cloud providers
have no prerogative to monitor their customers’ computations due
to customer privacy concerns. Since a timing attack leaves no trail
of compromised protection mechanisms, successful timing attacks
are unlikely to raise alarms and will probably just go unnoticed.
Thus, providers risk nothing by leaving timing attacks undetected
and unreported, whereas monitoring customers in order to detect
and report such attacks may invite privacy lawsuits.
Controlling timing channels via resource partitioning
undermines the cloud’s elasticity and business model.
One general approach to controlling timing channels is to limit
the rate at which one user’s demand for a shared resource may vis-
ibly affect the resource’s availability to another user, either by stat-
Figure 2: Timing-hardened cloud architecture. Gateways ac-
cept requests, dispatch deterministic jobs into the cloud, then
return job results that depend only on explicit job inputs, and
not on internal timing.
ically partitioning the resource or injecting noise into scheduling
decisions. Recent cache partitioning proposals exemplify this ap-
proach [21]. These methods limit the provider’s ability to oversub-
scribe and statistically multiplex shared hardware efficiently among
users, however, undermining the basic business model of cloud
computing. Without statistical multiplexing, the cloud loses its
elasticity, leaving the provider essentially selling only private in-
frastructure hosting and outsourced management services.
3. A TIMING-HARDENED CLOUD
We now explore a cloud computing architecture that closes all in-
ternal timing channels, regardless of number and types of shared re-
sources, leaving only one controllable timing channel at the bound-
ary. The basic idea is to make the cloud behave like a deterministic
batch job processor, reminiscent of early mainframes.
A computation needs access to two “clocks” to exploit any tim-
ing channel: a reference clock and a clock that can be modulated [37].
While standard approaches to timing channel control attempt to
limit visible clock modulation, our approach is to eliminate all in-
ternal reference clocks—even in the presence of parallelism.
3.1 Provider-Enforced Determinism
As illustrated in Figure 2, a set of gateway nodes at the cloud’s
boundary accepts job requests, including any inputs the job re-
quires. Upon completion, the gateway returns the job’s outputs,
which depend only on explicit inputs, and not on timings of op-
erations within the cloud. For each job, the cloud provider effec-
tively computes a pure mathematical function, whose outputs de-
pend only on the job’s explicit customer-provided inputs, and noth-
ing else. The provider’s cloud OS or VMM enforces this deter-
minism, ensuring that even malicious guest code can do nothing to
make its results depend on internal timing or other implicit inputs.
To process each job, the provider’s gateway breaks the job into
smaller work units and uses load-balancing algorithms controlled
by the provider to distribute work among cloud servers. These
servers may communicate internally while performing a job, pro-
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vided communication timing cannot affect computed results.
A customer’s job may also read and write the customer’s persis-
tent data stored in the cloud, provided any writes remain invisible
both externally and to other jobs until the writing job completes.
Each job in effect executes within a provider-enforced transaction.
The provider may statistically multiplex different customers’ jobs
freely onto shared hardware within the cloud, with no static parti-
tioning or scheduling noise injection. Provider-enforced determin-
ism nevertheless ensures that no timing or other nondeterministic
information leaks from one guest computation to another, and only
one unit of timing information per job leaks to the outside world:
namely the total time the job took to complete. This remaining
timing channel leaks only heavily aggregated information that is
unlikely to be easily exploitable, and the provider can limit this
timing channel’s information flow rate by returning job results to
customers on a periodic schedule—e.g., once per millesecond, sec-
ond, or minute—rather than immediately on job completion.
3.2 Applicability of the Architecture
The applicability of this cloud architecture depends on two ques-
tions: whether a strictly deterministic execution environment can
provide a practical programming model for cloud applications, and
whether such a deterministic environment can be efficient enough.
We address the first question here and the second in Section 4.
This architecture may be readily applicable to many large, paral-
lel, compute-bound applications such as scientific computing, ren-
dering, and data analysis. Nondeterminism in parallel applications
is usually undesired [9,23], so eliminating it benefits the developer.
The only common intentional nondeterminism in such applications
is for internal performance optimization purposes—e.g., distribut-
ing work items to workers according to dynamic availability and
load—and our architecture delegates these functions to the cloud
provider. Determinism thus simplifies the customer’s programming
task by eliminating pervasive heisenbugs [25], making all bugs re-
producible [22], and offloading load-balancing responsibilities to
the provider. Applicability thus reduces to the efficiency question.
While large compute-bound applications fit the proposed archi-
tecture most naturally, more interactive uses may be feasible as
well. A deterministic cloud might host interactive web applica-
tions, for example, as follows. The provider’s gateway nodes act
as generic front-end Web servers, accepting HTTP requests from
remote clients and converting them into deterministic job submis-
sions on behalf of the web application’s owner. The gateway at-
taches a job creation timestamp to each job’s inputs, enabling the
application to “tell time” at job granularity. A job’s results can re-
quest the gateway to start a follow-up job at a future time, enabling
the web application to implement timeouts, push notifications on
persistent sockets, etc. The remaining questions are whether such
a “gateway-driven” web programming model can be made suffi-
ciently familiar for customers implementing web applications, and
whether the provider can support job creation and dispatch at suf-
ficiently high rate and fine granularity to handle customer response
time requirements. We believe both of these questions can be an-
swered be answered positively, the first using appropriate runtime
libraries or virtualization mechanisms, the second via efficient de-
terministic execution as described later.
3.3 Life Without Timing Channels
Our architecture requires that the provider manage scheduling
and load-balancing decisions within a cloud, since enabling cus-
tomers to do so would involve leaking potentially sensitive timing
information into customer computations and their outputs. An im-
portant concern is whether the unavailability of this fine-grained
internal timing information will make it difficult for customers to
develop and optimize their parallel applications effectively: e.g., to
perform detailed profiling-based analysis of their applications, or
to implement application-specific dynamic optimizations or load-
balancing schemes within their applications.
The unavailability of fine-grained timing information to customers
may indeed present a challenge for application profiling purposes.
A customer’s application need not run always or only on a shared
cloud, however. The customer might perform development and
testing on a smaller private cloud owned or exclusively leased by
the customer. Even after deployment, the customer might distribute
an application across both shared and customer-private infrastruc-
ture, giving the customer access to full timing information on the
physical machines the customer owns or has leased exclusively.
Some applications may require dynamic, application-specific in-
ternal load-balancing algorithms in order to perform well. To sup-
port such applications, a provider might allow customers to sup-
ply application-specific scheduling or load-balancing “plug-ins,”
as long as the provider’s OS ensures that these plug-ins can affect
only the application’s performance and not its job outputs. The
provider’s OS might enforce such constraints on load-balancing
plug-ins via sandboxing mechanisms for untrusted kernel exten-
sions [7], or by running the application’s load-balancing code in
user space and using DIFC techniques [17, 38] to track processes
that have been “tainted” with timing information, and prevent this
timing information from leaking back to the customer.
4. A DETERMINISTIC CLOUD OS
Our architecture’s “magic ingredient,” obviously, is provider-
enforced deterministic execution. Most cloud-oriented operating
systems and virtual machine monitors replicate the inherently non-
deterministic execution model provided by the underlying multi-
processor/multicore hardware. Recent application-level determin-
istic scheduling techniques show promise [5,6], but they apply only
within a process and do not prevent a guest from intentionally es-
caping its “deterministic sandbox.” The only system we are aware
of that enforces determinism on multiprocessor guests does so by
recording and replaying a previous (nondeterministic) execution,
and imposes a high performance cost [15].
To offer evidence that the proposed architecture may be prac-
tical, we introduce Determinator, a novel OS that enforces deter-
minism on multi-process parallel computations at moderate cost,
while supporting familiar parallel programming abstractions such
as fork/join synchronization, shared memory, and file systems. We
describe Determinator from a more general perspective elsewhere [4],
but we briefly summarize here the aspects relevant to timing chan-
nel control in the cloud.
Determinator is intended to supervise the compute nodes in a
cloud architecture such as that shown in Figure 2. We believe cloud
providers will have an incentive to deploy deterministic compute
clouds based on an OS designed along the lines of Determinator,
because of the enhanced data privacy assurance that a deterministic
cloud could offer security-conscious customers. Integrating Deter-
minator into a trusted cloud computing model [31] could further
increase both real and perceived security.
Our current priority is to demonstrate the viability of OS-enforced
deterministic execution of compute-bound jobs. Determinator cur-
rently provides no persistent storage, and does not emulate hard-
ware interfaces or host existing operating systems, although we in-
tend to expand Determinator’s capabilities in the future.
We now outline Determinator’s basic execution environment and
API, the consistency model it uses to manage state logically shared
among parallel processes, and how it supports both threads inter-
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Figure 3: Determinator process model. Each guest owns a hi-
erarchy of processes/threads executing in parallel.
acting via (logically) shared memory and Unix-like processes in-
teracting via a (logically) shared file system. We make no claim
that this is the “right” way to implement a determinism-enforcing
OS, but merely use Determinator to explore some key design chal-
lenges and solutions, and how Determinator’s design potentially
addresses the goal of timing-hardened cloud computing.
4.1 Process Model
Determinator gives each guest an independent process hierarchy,
as shown in Figure 3: it creates a root process on behalf of the cus-
tomer, and existing processes can create new child processes. Un-
like Unix, but as in nested process models [18], Determinator’s hi-
erarchy strictly constrains process lifetime and inter-process com-
munication. A process cannot outlive its parent, and a process can
communicate directly only with its immediate parent and children.
Although all guest processes can execute in parallel, Determina-
tor enforces determinism in two ways. First, from the kernel’s per-
spective, each process is single-threaded and shares no state with
other processes. Each process has its own registers and address
space, and processes cannot share read/write access to the same
physical memory, thereby ensuring that each process’s internal ex-
ecution is deterministic as long as the processor’s underlying in-
struction set is deterministic. Second, Determinator constrains the
inter-process communication and synchronization of all processes
to act as a Kahn process network [19], which provably yields de-
terministic behavior globally in spite of parallel execution.
4.2 Process Execution and API
Determinator processes can have three states: runnable, stopped,
and waiting. Runnable processes can execute concurrently with all
other runnable processes, according to a kernel-controlled schedul-
ing policy, but do not interact with each other while running. (Pro-
cesses could offer the kernel “scheduling hints” such as priori-
ties, which the OS might use or ignore, but determinism precludes
any explicit feedback from the OS affecting computed results.) A
stopped process does nothing until its parent explicitly starts it. A
waiting process is blocked until a particular child stops, at which
point the waiting process becomes runnable again.
All inter-process interaction is driven by processor traps and the
kernel’s three system calls: PUT, GET, and RET. PUT waits un-
til a designated child stops, then copies a block of virtual memory
and/or register state into the child, and also optionally: (a) copies
the child’s entire virtual address space into a reference snapshot as-
sociated with the child; and/or (b) (re-)starts the child. GET waits
until a designated child stops, then copies or merges a block of
the child’s virtual memory, and/or the child’s final register state,
back into the parent. A merge is like a copy, except Determinator
copies only words that differ between the child’s current and ref-
erence snapshots into the parent’s address space, leaving all other
words in the parent untouched. RET explicitly stops the current
process, effectively returning control to the parent. Exceptions such
as divide-by-zero in any process have the effect of a RET, providing
the parent a status code indicating why the child stopped.
The above interaction model ensures global determinism because
processes interact only at well-defined execution points determined
by each process’s internal flow: namely when the parent does a
GET or PUT and the designated child has stopped. The kernel
gives ordinary processes no ability to wait for “the first child that
stops,” nor to race each other to insert or remove items from mes-
sage queues shared among multiple threads. See the underlying
formal model [19] for more details.
If any process contains a bug causing an endless loop, other pro-
cesses trying to synchronize with it might block forever. To ad-
dress this risk and facilitate debugging, a processes can specify an
instruction limit when it starts a child: the child and its descendants
collectively execute at most this many instructions before the kernel
forcibly returns control to the parent. Counting instructions enables
processes to regain control of errant children without violating de-
terminism, and also allows processes to “quantize” the execution of
children and implement deterministic scheduling schemes [5, 13].
4.3 Emulating Logically Shared State
Since the kernel permits processes to share no physical state,
they can communicate only by copying data via GET and PUT.
The kernel uses copy-on-write to optimize large virtual copies, and
uses similar techniques to optimize merge operations, so merging
a page that either the parent or the child have left unmodified re-
quires only page-level remapping. Leveraging this efficient virtual
copy primitive, the C library linked into each process implements
logical shared state abstractions purely in user space. The C li-
brary emulates shared state by treating the guest’s process hierarchy
like a distributed system. Each process maintains a replica of the
shared state, and processes reconcile this state at well-defined syn-
chronization points during program execution, as in replicated file
systems [26] and distributed shared memory (DSM) systems [11].
Shared File System.
Determinator’s C library currently emulates the Unix file API
by reading and writing a file system image stored in the process’s
own virtual memory. (Files could alternatively be stored in child
processes not used for execution, reducing address space usage and
the danger of wild memory writes corrupting shared files.)
The C library also implements Unix’s fork, exec*, and wait*
functions, to create and execute child processes whose virtual mem-
ory is not logically shared with the parent but whose file system is
shared. The fork function clones the parent process, including
file system image, into a new child process. The exec* functions
replace the current process, except for its file system image, with a
new executable loaded from the file system.
The wait* functions not only synchronize with a child process
as in Unix, but also use file versioning [26] to merge the parent’s
and child’s file system changes. The file system implements no
locking or ownership, so concurrent writes to a file cause conflicts,
which the C library detects and flags. A conflict makes further file
access attempts return errors, until the user resolves the conflict and
explicitly clears the flag (or fixes the bug causing the conflict and
reruns the job). Concurrent writes are allowed in one case, how-
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ever: if all writes are append-only (O_APPEND), as with standard
output or log files, reconciliation simply collects all appends with-
out concern for file offsets or ordering, yielding effects analogous
to those of asynchronous appends in Unix.
Shared Memory.
Determinator’s C library also emulates shared memory paral-
lelism, currently via a simple thread fork/join API. The tfork
function clones the entire parent process, like fork, but tjoin
not only merges file system changes but also merges the child’s
changes to regular process memory into the parent, using the ker-
nel’s merge operation described in Section 4.2. The result is a de-
terministic analog of release-consistent DSM [11] we refer to as
deterministic consistency, detailed elsewhere [3]. Unlike determin-
istic schedulers that emulate sequential consistency by executing
threads under an artificial “round-robin” schedule [5, 6, 13], deter-
ministic consistency need not rely on speculation to achieve paral-
lelism and never needs to re-execute code due to misspeculation.
Deterministic consistency also makes the effects of parallel execu-
tion not only precisely repeatable but also more predictable to the
software developer. If two threads execute the statements x = y
and y = x concurrently, for example, under deterministic consis-
tency the result is always to swap the values of x and y, whereas
under deterministic schedulers the result depends on relative code
path lengths and hence on subtle program input variations. De-
terminator’s runtime can also provide deterministic scheduling for
compatibility with legacy parallel code, though this execution mode
has performance and predictability costs [4].
4.4 Implementation
An early Determinator prototype currently runs on the 32-bit x86
architecture, and implements both the shared file system and shared
memory parallel APIs described above atop the kernel’s determin-
istic “shared-nothing” processes. The prototype has no TCP/IP net-
working or persistent storage as yet, and merely accepts jobs from
the console. The shared file system supports only 256 files, each
up to 4MB in size, reflecting the limitations of a 32-bit address
space. The prototype nevertheless suggests the feasibility of pro-
viding convenient and familiar parallel programming abstractions
under a regime of kernel-enforced determinism.
4.5 Preliminary Results
To offer some evidence that the timing-hardened cloud comput-
ing architecture proposed in this paper may be feasible and efficient
at least for some workloads, we briefly evaluate the current Deter-
minator prototype using several parallel benchmarks. We use the
following benchmarks: md5 is an “embarrassingly parallel” brute-
force MD5 password cracker; matmult is a 1024 × 1024 integer
matrix multiply; qsort is a recursive parallel quicksort on an inte-
ger array; blackscholes is a financial benchmark from the PARSEC
suite [8]; fft is a parallel Fast Fourier Transform from SPLASH-
2 [36]; and lu_cont and lu_noncont are LU-decomposition bench-
marks also from SPLASH-2. We ran all benchmarks on a 12-core
(2 sockets × 6 cores), 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron PC.
Figure 4 shows each benchmark’s performance running deter-
ministically on Determinator, normalized to nondeterministic exe-
cution performance on Ubuntu Linux 9.10, using 1–12 CPU cores.
Coarse-grained parallel benchmarks such as md5, matmult, and
qsort, which perform a substantial amount of computation between
inter-thread synchronization events, consistently run nearly as fast
and sometimes faster on Determinator compared with Linux. The
md5 benchmark surprisingly scales much better on Determinator
than on Linux, achieving more than 2× speedup over Linux on 12
Figure 4: Performance of several parallel benchmarks running
deterministically on Determinator, versus nondeterministic ex-
ecution on Linux.
cores; we have not yet determined the precise cause of this per-
formance increase but suspect bottlenecks in Linux’s thread sys-
tem [33]. The blackscholes benchmark is also “embarrassingly par-
allel,” but our port of this benchmark uses deterministic scheduling
for compatibility with the pthreads API, incurring a constant per-
formance overhead [4]. The more fine-grained SPLASH-2 bench-
marks exhibit higher performance costs on Determinator due to
their more frequent inter-thread synchronization.
We also examined whether we could more easily reduce (though
not eliminate) timing information leaks in stock Linux kernels, sim-
ply by removing access to accurate timers in both the kernel and
applications. Disabling these high-resolution timers does not pre-
vent processes from creating ad hoc timers via parallel threads, of
course, as discussed in Section 2 and illustrated in Figure 1. Nev-
ertheless, to test the effect of timer unavailability on a stock OS,
we compiled the Linux kernel and applications to eliminate use
of cycle counting instructions such as rdtsc and high-resolution
timers. Interestingly, we found that the throughput of the Apache
web server under load dropped by about 20% compared to the un-
modified case, because web server and the kernel TCP/IP stack rely
on high-resolution timers for estimating client latency, cache sizes,
etc. This result suggests that there are no simple workarounds to
close timing channels while delivering high throughput.
TCP’s dependency on high-resolution timers does not present
an immediate problem in our proposed cloud architecture, as long
as TCP is implemented in a provider-controlled kernel or VMM:
the provider’s kernel is trusted and can use high-resolution timers.
Dependencies on high-resolution timers in application-level suites
such as Web services, however, are likely to present a pragmatic
challenge when run under any timing channel control mechanism;
we leave further evaluation of these challenges to future work.
5. RELATED WORK
Timing channels are well-studied [20, 37], but only recently ex-
amined in the cloud context [12, 30]. Most proposed solutions to
recent cache-based attacks [1, 2, 28, 35] involve cache partition-
ing [21], requiring hardware modifications and decreasing perfor-
mance. Specific algorithms may be hardened [34], but the only
known general solution—resource partitioning—limits statistical
multiplexing and undermines the cloud business model.
Deterministic execution has been used for other purposes such as
replay debugging [22] and intrusion analysis [14], and its benefits
for parallel programming are well-recognized [9, 23]. Parallel lan-
guages such as SHIM [16] and DPJ [9] provide deterministic pro-
gramming models for these reasons, but they cannot run legacy or
multi-process parallel code. User-level deterministic schedulers [5,
6] can provide determinism within one well-behaved process, but
cannot supervise multiple interacting processes or prevent misbe-
haved applications from escaping the deterministic environment.
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Cloud providers must be able to enforce determinism in guests
in order to eliminate timing channels using our architecture. The
only system we know of that can enforce determinism on multipro-
cessor guests is SMP-ReVirt [15]. While impressive, SMP-ReVirt
is designed to replay prior nondeterministic executions, rather than
to execute guests deterministically “from the start,” and its perfor-
mance cost is too high for everyday use.
6. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new, general approach to combating timing
channels in clouds via provider-enforced deterministic execution.
The key benefit of this approach is that it eliminates the exploitabil-
ity of all timing channels internal to a cloud, independent of the
type of resource manifesting the channel, without undermining the
cloud’s elasticity through resource partitioning. Preliminary results
from our determinism-enforcing OS suggest that such a timing-
hardened architecture may be feasible and efficient at least for some
applications, but many questions remain. Can such an architecture
support fine-grained parallel applications, interactive Web applica-
tions, transactional storage- or communication-intensive applica-
tions? Can it offer cloud customers a rich and convenient, yet ef-
ficient, programming model in which to express such applications
deterministically? Can deterministic clouds reuse legacy software
and operating systems? Only further exploration will tell.
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